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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the close corporation and frustrate its continuance. While it is diffi-
cult to understand the objectives achieved by the decision, it is in
accord with the weight of authority.4 It further demonstrates the
necessity of providing for every possible contingency which might
adversely affect the affairs of the corporation in a sale or transfer
of its shares of stock.' 7
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Labor Law-Secondary Consumer Boycotts, Picketing, and
Publicity-The Landrum-Griffin Amendment to the Labor
Management Relations Act
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
amined statutory restrictions on secondary boycott activity and, for
the first time, the extension of these restrictions in the labor reform
legislation of 1959. The Court held in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers' that Congress did not intend that the 1959 Landrum-Grif-
fin amendments2 to section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management
" See note 22 supra.
" The need for providing for every contingency is shown in Albert E.
Touchet, Inc. v. Thompson, 259 Mass. 220, 156 N.E. 41 (1927), where
the court held that even though the bylaw of the corporation was binding
-on the shareholder, his executor, administrator, or assignee to offer the
stock for appraisal with rights to purchase it in the corporation, it was
,not binding on the deceased shareholder's special administrator, since the
special administrator had not been provided for in the bylaw. But see
Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947),
where the court in effect held that restrictions are usually construed to
permit the widest range under the language used.
1377 U.S. 58 (1964).
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in any industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course
of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodi-
ties or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)' be applied to prohibit secondary
consumer picketing when the public is asked "only to boycott the
primary employer's goods." 4 In a companion decision, NLRB v.
Servette, Inc.,5 handed down the same day, the Court held that
though Congress had expanded the class protected from induce-
ment by subsection (i) of the amended act from "employees" to
"any individual employed by any person," inducement of such indi-
viduals was lawful when it was designed to induce "a policy de-
cision"' or was "an appeal for the exercise of managerial discre-
tion."'
In Fruit Packers, the striking union picketed certain super-
markets that were selling at retail apples packed by the struck
employers. Placards worn by the pickets and handbills distributed
by them asked customers of the supermarkets not to buy the apples.
The customers were not asked to cease dealing with the markets,
nor were employees of the supermarkets asked to cease work, to
been certified as the representative of such employees under the pro-
visions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained
in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4)
only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public, including consumers and members of labor
organizations, that a product or products are produced by an em-
ployer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and
are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does
not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any per-
son other than the primary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not
to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer en-
gaged in such distribution.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Grif-
fin Act) § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
'61 Stat. 140 (1947). The 1959 amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act
(a) changed the phrase "employees of any employer" to "any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or any industry affecting
commerce," (b) eliminated the qualification of a refusal as "concerted," (c)
added subsection (ii) prohibiting the threatening, coercing, or restraining
of a person engaged in commerce, etc. (d) rewrote the clauses to some
extent, shifting certain objects from clause (A) to clause (B), (e) added
the proviso to clause (B), and (f) added the second proviso protecting
publicity other than picketing.
'377 U.S. at 63.
'377 U.S. 46 (1964).0Id. at 49.
"Id. at 50 n.4.
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refuse to handle the apples, or to honor the picket lines in any way.'
Care was taken by the union to make these distinctions as clear as
possible to all parties.' In Servette, representatives of the striking
union asked supermarket managers to cease dealing in products
supplied by the struck distributor and warned that handbills would
be passed out in front of those markets which continued to deal
with the distributor. In some cases handbills were actually passed
out, asking customers not to buy the Servette-distributed products.
The National Labor Relations Board, following its ruling in
Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Fur-
nishing),"° held that the union's actions in Fruit Packers were a per
se violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in that they threatened,
coerced, or restrained a person (i.e., a supermarket, a corporate per-
son) engaged in commerce."' The Board found that the picketing
was not aimed at and did not induce the supermarket employees
(individuals employed by a person engaged in commerce) and thus
did not violate section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), but ruled that, by its very
nature, consumer product picketing could not help but threaten,
coerce, or restrain the supermarkets."2 Since the second proviso to
section 8(b) (4) expressly excepted picketing from the protection
it afforded other truthful publicity, and because Minneapolis House
Furnishing had already rejected any implied protection it might
afford to picketing aimed exclusively'at the consumer public, the
Board did not find it necessary to discuss the proviso again in this
case. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected the Board's holding that picketing was a per se violation of
subsection (ii), observing that section 8(b) (7) demonstrated that
Congress had been more specific when its purpose was to ban all
"[P]ickets were... instructed 'to patrol peacefully in front of the con-
sumer entrances, to stay away from the delivery entrances ... ."' 377 U.S.
at 61.
'Id. at 73-76 (Appendix).
10 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.
1964). In denying enforcement the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
cited the Supreme Court's Fruit Packers decision.
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits Labor Committee), 132
N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
12 The purpose of picketing Safeway stores was to persuade con-
sumers not to purchase nonunion Washington State apples which
Safeway in turn purchased from members of Tree Fruits. The
natural and forseeable result of such picketing, if successful, would
be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to discontinue alto-




picketing in a particular circumstance, and held that to find the
picketing in this case was unlawful would require a finding that it
did in fact threaten, coerce, or restrain the supermarkets."3 It re.
manded the case to the Board so that it might hear evidence on
this point. The court of appeals read the publicity proviso as pro-
tecting publicity, other than picketing, even when it did in fact
threaten, coerce, or restrain. Picketing that did not in fact threaten,
coerce, or restrain did not need any protection the proviso might
have afforded.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court majority rejected both views
taken below, reasoning that Congress has prohibited peaceful picket-
ing only when dealing "'explicitly with isolated evils which experi-
ence has established flow from such picketing,' -'i and holding that
no such explicitness concerning product picketing, as contrasted with
general secondary picketing, is to be found in the legislative history
of the amendment. 5 It thus took the position that, absent the
specificity required of picketing ban legislation, secondary consumer
picketing that was limited to following the struck product as a
matter of law did not threaten, coerce, or restrain the secondary
employer. Since the picketing did not threaten, coerce, or restrain,
it did not need the protection of the publicity proviso, and thus the
Court did not have to deal with the exception of picketing from
that protection.
In the companion Servette case, the Board, on the basis of a
high-low level supervisor-manager test established in Local 505,
Teamsters Union (Carolina Lumber)'" and followed in Minneapolis
House Furnishing, decided that the supermarket managers were
high level supervisors whom the union could induce or incourage
to cease doing business with other persons and thus they were not
individuals within the intent of the act.' The Carolina Lumber
test described such high level supervisors as executives who made
managerial decisions and who were not likely to neglect their em-
ployer's interests because of sympathies in common with rank and
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
62 CoLum. L. Rlv. 1336.14377 U.S. at 62-63, quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362
U.S. 274, 284 (1960).
"The Court rejected indications that at least the opponents of the bill
understood it to prohibit consumer product picketing. 377 U.S. at 66.130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
Wholesale Delivery Drivers Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501
(1961).
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file employees. High level supervisors, although they are not indi-
viduals within the meaning of subsection (i), are protected from
threats, restraint, or coercion by subsection (ii) since it seems clear
that "person" in this subsection means both physical and corporate
persons. On the other hand, low level supervisors such as gang
foremen are not to be induced under this test because they are
likely to have interests closely aligned with labor, including occa-
sionally even union membership. This latter class is protected by
both subsections, as are non-supervisory employees. There is no
clear dividing line that can be drawn between high and low level.
Each new case must be considered on all factors of company organi-
zation including, but not exclusively, the supervisor-manager's
authority and responsibility, his working conditions, his salary, and
his benefits.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, taking a literal view
of the statute's wording, discarded the Carolina Lumber test, but
it reversed the Board on the basis that Servette, a distributor, was
not a producer within the meaning of the publicity proviso and
thus the handbilling activities of the union were not protected by
it.'" This position had been taken by dissenting Board Member
Rodgers, who also determined that the handbills distributed by the
union had not been truthful.'" The Board majority did not elabo-
rate its finding that a distributor such as Servette was not a pro-
ducer, having done so already in a previous case.
20
The Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision, supported the
Board's view of Servette as a producer2' and followed the court
of appeals in its rejection of Carolina Lumber. It held, in a foot-
note to its opinion, that the applicability of subsection (i) turned
not upon the high-low level supervisor-manager distinction but "up-
on whether the union's appeal is to cease performing employment
services, or is an appeal for the exercise of managerial discretion."'
The language of section 8(b) (4), before and after the 1959
amendments, has never been a subject of easy interpretation for
1 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962). See Great
Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
19 133 N.L.R.B. at 1502. See Middle South Broadcasting Co., 133
N.L.R.B. 1698, 1706 (1961); Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), 132
N.L.R.B. 901, 910 (1961).
° Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), supra note 19.
21377 U.S. at 55.
" Id. at 50 n.4.
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the courts." To have construed it literally, prior to the amendment,
would have been to ban even primary picketing, 4 and this was not
the intent of Congress.2" Under the original language, the induce-
ment or encouragement had to be concerted, so that an isolated
incident of inducement was not covered.26 Even if the picketing was
at the secondary employer's place of business, it was not barred
unless its object was to cause the secondary employer's employees
to walk out." Supervisors, since they were specifically not "em-
ployees" as defined by the act,2 8 could be induced or encouraged to
support the union, no matter how low their position.29 And the
employees of certain activities, such as government agencies, 30 were
not covered since these activities were not employers subject to the
act.3 '
Congress sought, by the 1959 amendment, 2 to clarify and
broaden the coverage of this section. 3 In attempting to close the
"This section is "surely one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever
included in a federal labor statute . . . ." Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1113 (1960).
'International Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 667, 672 (1961).
" NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951).2 0 Id. at 670-71.2
,NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F.2d
553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956). "It was not shown
that the picketing had any tendency to induce the employees to strike or
cease performing services." 228 F.2d at 560.
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), (11),
61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11) (1959).
"' Sheet Metal Workers (Ferro-Co Corp.), 102 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1953)(substitute foreman); Local 878, Teamsters Union (Arkansas Express),
92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1950) (shipping dock foreman, a union member); Local
294, Teamsters Union (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd
mb nora. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952) (management
representatives).3°International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 61
Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1959). See International Wood-
workers (W. T. Smith Lumber Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 1756 (1956), enforce-
nent denied sub nom. W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 129, 132
(5th Cir. 1957) (railroad); Local 833, UAW (Paper Makers Importing
Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956) (municipal employees). Compare DiGiorgio
Fruit Corp., 87 N.L.R.B. 720, 721 (1949), enforced, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951), where a farm labor union was
not prohibited from secondary boycott activity since it was not subject to
the act.
"For the text of the amendment, see note 2 supra. For the textual
changes it made, see note 3 supra.
"'NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51 (1964); Aaron, supra note
23, at 1114; Cox, The Landrum-Griflin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. Rv. 257, 270 (1959).
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loopholes, it included isolated incidents of inducement by eliminat-
ing the word "concerted" in subsection (i) and enlarged the class
covered by this subsection at the very least to include low level
supervisors, by the change in language to "any individual employed
by any person." Coverage was extended to threats, coercion, and
restraint of any person by the addition of subsection (ii), thus
taking in secondary activities not directed solely at employees. Since
Senate conferees were unable to persuade their House brethren not
to prohibit at least some kinds of secondary picketing, the publicity
proviso was added to protect "informational activity short of picket-
ing."8' The proviso to clause (B) was added to clarify Congress'
intention not to obstruct picketing that was primary. But at least
one author of the amendments, and other persons, have expressed
the old problems were solved, new ones have arisen in the extension
misgivings about the Board's understanding of these changes.8 5 As
of coverage to secondary consumer activity, in the addition of the
proviso excepting certain kinds of this activity, and in the exten-
sion of coverage to a larger class of individuals that are employed.
It is in these areas that the Court has spoken in the two instant cases.
In Fruit Packers, the Supreme Court majority's distinction be-
tween unlawful secondary consumer picketing "to persuade the
customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in
order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon,
the primary employer,"3' 6 and lawful secondary consumer picketing
"directed only at the struck product" T is not a distinction "alluded to
in the [Congressional] debates,""8 nor made by commentators on
the amendment immediately after its passage. 0 It is, however, a
distinction made by other authorities, 40 including the Restatement
8, 105 CONG. REc. 17898-99 (1959).
"5 Browne, The National Labor Relations Board: Labor Law Rewritten,
49 A.B.A.J. 64 (1963).
"5377 U.S. at 63.8 TIbid.8 1d. at 64.
See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 23; Cox, supra note 33.Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 286-87, 11 N.E.2d 910, 913
(1937). This case held that a unity of interest would permit struck prod-
uct picketing at the secondary employer's place of business but contained
dictum that picketing asking a withdrawal of business from the secondary
employer was illegal. Id. at 286, 11 N.E.2d at 912. See 1 TELLER, LABOR
DIsPuTEs AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING § 123 (1940). Compare People v.
Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941), permitting more than struck
product picketing where the secondary employer uses the services of the
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of Torts.41 Here the Court may have chosen to read a distinction
not expressly stated by Congress in order to avoid the constitutional
question of a blanket ban against picketing.42 This possibility was
suggested by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in which
he held the section, as applied against product picketing, in viola-
tion of the first amendment.43 Black separated the coercive "patrol-
ling" aspect of picketing from the non-coercive "speech" 44 element
and reasoned that since it is the object of the picketing (a consumer
boycott that threatens, coerces, or restrains a neutral secondary
employer) that is determinative of the ban, the amendment is at-
tacking the "speech" element. If the picketing were, for example,
a protest against the supermarkets' own labor practices, the "patrol-
ling" would be unchanged; only the "speech" would be different
and the picketing would be lawful. Mr. Justice Harlan (joined by
Mr. Justice Stewart in dissenting) set out a position supported by
Black that all secondary consumer picketing is covered by the ban
and that none of it is protected by the publicity proviso. But Harlan
argued that it is the "patrolling" element that is being restricted,
especially since other forms of expressing the same "speech" are
permitted.45
Restraints on peaceful picketing were broadly condemned by
the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama.41 But this position has been
modified so that it is now fairly clear that picketing may be pro-
primary employer, with Local 142, Plumbers' Union (Shop-Rite Foods,
Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961).
1 In all cases, however, the scope of the request must be limited to
A and his products .... B, the retailer, is also not entitled to com-
plain, since the action is not directed at him and his loss of sales,
if any, is due only to the diminution in the prestige of goods which
he buys and markets . . . . If, however, the third persons are re-
quested not to buy other goods from B because he sells A's soap, the
rule stated in this section is inapplicable ....
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 799, comment on clause (a) (1939). Cf. REsTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 801 (1939).
42 This is the position of one recent treatment of the case. Note, 42
TExAs L. REV. 905 (1964).
377 U.S. at 76-80.
"Id. at 77. See Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Bakery
Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
' "[T]hat Congress in prohibiting secondary consumer picketing has
acted with a discriminating eye is the very thing that renders this provision
invulnerable to constitutional attack." 377 U.S. at 93.
" 310 U.S. 88 (1940). "In the circumstances of our times the dissemina-
tion of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be re-
garded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution." Id. at 102.
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hibited if its object is either unlawfu4 7 or "far outweighed" by the
interests that would be harmed by the picketing.48 Even if the
picketing is considered to be speech, it may be restricted to the area
of the primary dispute.4" This line of cases suggests that, recog-
nizing an unequivocal congressional ban on secondary consumer
picketing aimed only at the product and thus compelled to deal with
the constitutional question, the majority opinion in Fruit Packers
could be read as exhibiting a willingness to find that the evils seen
by Congress justified the prohibition."
In the first attempts at dealing with secondary boycotts, the
concern and emphasis was with the detrimental effect on the neutral
secondary employer. "Picketing the premises of a secondary is of
course a prototype secondary boycott, forbidden by the act.'",' Com-
plications arose in the blending of permitted primary effects and
undesired secondary effects of picketing when the primary employer
and secondary employer were doing business on common or adjacent
premises. These complications led the Board, in Sailor's Union
(Moore Dry Dock Co.),5 to declare that picketing at a common
situs was permitted at times when the primary employer was en-
gaged in normal business on the site of the secondary employer,
provided the picketing was performed so as to disclose clearly that
the dispute is with the primary employer only. This rule was
limited by Brewery Drivers (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling
Works)' to situations in which the primary employer had no sepa-
rate place of business that could be picketed. However, this limita-
tion was at least somewhat removed by Local 861, Int'l Bhd. of
"Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
,8 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 477 (1950).
But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech
does not imply that the states must be without power to confine the
sphere of communications to that directly related to the dispute.
Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a
labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional
modes of communication.
Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1942).
" See Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rxv.
574, 591-602 (1951).
1 Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. R1v.
1363, 1374 (1962).
5292 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950) (primary employer's ship at secondary em-
ployer's dock).
107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955)(picketing at retail outlets asked public not to buy Coca-Cola).
[Vol. 43
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Elec. Workers (Plauche Elec., Inc.)."' Thus, the lawfulness of such
picketing in such blended situations remains unclear.55
Fruit Packers, however, places little emphasis on the secondary
character of the picketing, i.e., that it is on a clearly secondary site.56
The Court gives lip service to the strict traditional view that this
is a secondary boycott because "its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third
party who has no concern in it,"" but, by implication, seems to
move toward abandoning it. The aim of the picketing in Fruit
Packers, the Court found, was not "to compel [the neutral second-
ary employer] . . . to stop business with the [primary] employer
in the hope that this will induce the [primary] employer to give in
to his employees' demands."5 Rather, it was primary picketing, in
that it was aimed at sales depended upon by the primary employer,
with inevitable secondary side effects-a drop in the supermarkets'
sales of apples and some contingent economic damage to the markets
-which are unfortunate but not the subject of real concern. When
the side effects are thus de-emphasized, perhaps the picketing could
be viewed as not within section 8(b) (4) at all.59 Whether the
Court could comfortably make the same de-emphasis if the second-
ary employer were a one-product retailer is a question raised by
5' 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962) (workers spending entire day on secondary
site after reporting in at primary site).
" See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964), the Court's
most recent ruling in this area.
0 When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined
to the primary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include
the premises of the secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds,
the secondary employer's purchases from the struck firm are de-
creased only because the public has diminished its purchase of the
struck product.
377 U.S. at 72. (Emphasis added.) See also Local 761, Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), stating:
Important as is the distinction between legitimate "primary activity"
and banned "secondary activity," it does not present a glaringly
bright line. The objectives of any picketing include a desire to
influence others from withholding from the employer their services
or trade.
Id. at 673.
"' International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.).
8 Ibid.
" See Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1265, 1278 (1964). The author there takes
the position that "the expansion of the concept of primary dispute to en-
compass product picketing may run counter to the rationale of many cases
involving common situs picketing." Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent.60 On its face, the majority's
decision in Fruit Packers would seem to preclude any other emphasis.
While the above basis can be found for the Fruit Packers de-
cision, Servette established an entirely new rule of labor law by
shifting the test of proscribed section 8(b) (4) inducement from
the type of employee or individual induced to the function that he
is to perform or not to perform. The Court supplies no definition
of the exercise of "managerial discretion" 1 and cites nothing in
explanation of the term, either in congressional action or else-
where.62 Though the new rule would not alter the outcome if ap-
plied by the National Labor Relations Board in the instant case,63
it cannot be dismissed as dicta. 4
" E.g., an "independent gas station owner [who] sells gasoline pur-
chased from a struck gas company," as in Harlan's example. 377 U.S. at 83.
To the one-product retailer, the distinction is certainly of no comfort. If
the picketing is successful, he is put out of business either way. But is his
unity of interest with the gas company sufficient to justify this?
" NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50 n.4 (1964).
"2 Quaere, when is discretion not managerial and its inducement thus
presumably unlawful under section 8(b) (4) (i) as a withdrawal of serv-
ices, if ever? To remain within the Servette fact situation, if the union had
approached a low level employee, perhaps a union member, who was re-
sponsible for storefront displays and induced him not to use Servette-distrib-
uted products in his displays, would his action be a refusal "to perform
...services," a "refusal in the course of his employment to use ... any
goods," or an exercise of managerial discretion within the rule? A situa-
tion similar to this arose in Local 294, Teamsters Union (Van Transport
Lines), 131 N.L.R.B. 242, enforced, 298 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1961).
" It is doubtful that use of the managerial discretion test would have
changed the results in other cases decided by the Board on the high-low
level principle. See, e.g., Warehouse Employees Union (C. R. Sheaffer &
Sons), 136 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962) (manager refused to accept delivery of
struck products after being informed union would handbill, an activity
deemed legal); Teamsters Union (Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134
N.L.R.B. 895 (1961); Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), 132 N.L.R.B.
901 (1961); Excavating & Building Material Chauffeurs Union (Consalvo
Trucking, Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. 827 (1961) (held, a managerial decision);
Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Furnishing),
132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964);
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n (S. M. Kisner & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B.
1196 (1961) (vice president told union "wished" that a subcontract not be
awarded struck employer); Amalgamated Meat Cutters (Peyton Packing
Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. 406 (1961) (meat market manager asked to stop or
slow down buying from struck employer); Local 294, Teamsters Union(Van Transport Lines), 131 N.L.R.B. 242, enforced, 298 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1961); Local 324, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers (Brewer's City Coal
Dock), 131 N.L.R.B. 228 (1961) (inducement of top supervisor not to ac-
cept delivery of struck sand); Local 505, Teamsters Union (Carolina
Lumber), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1960).
" Respondent Servette argued that the evidence disclosed that the man-
agers in fact had no managerial discretion to exercise in dealing with
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The liberal rather than the restrictive approach to statutory
interpretation in the labor field is seen in Servette in the Court's
approach to the subsection (i) phrase "any individual employed by
any person." Though Congress intended to close the loophole in
the original section 8(b) (4) whereby "supervisors" 5 were not pro-
tected from inducement, any apparent broadening of the protection
to all persons employed of whatever description had been severely
limited by the Board in decisions following Carolina Lumber.66 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to correct this
limitation by reading the new phrase in its plain, literal, and broad-
est sense." The Supreme Court agreed,6" but to leave this as its
decision would limit the union's appeal for support in its dispute
to "employers" or "persons engaged in commerce" alone. If the
"person" is not an individual proprietorship or a partnership, but a
corporation, under this literal reading there is no one within the
business enterprise who legally can be induced. To induce the corpo-
rate person it is necessary to induce some individual employed by it.
To avoid this trap it was necessary for the Court to examine the
function that an individual of the now all-inclusive class is to be
induced to perform or not to perform.
There is direct support for the Court's reading of "produced"
in the publicity proviso as intended by Congress to include activi-
ties such as those of Servette.69 If the Court had been intent in
taking the restrictive rather than the liberal approach to statutory
interpretation in the labor field, it could have attached "significance
to the fact that an earlier version of the proviso read: '. . . that goods
are produced or distributed by an employer . . . .' "" The omission
of the italicized phrase could have been read as a deliberate intention
Servette. They had to consult with their supervisors. Brief for Respondent,
pp. 20-22, NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964). It was also argued
that corporate officers were not included in "any individual." Id. at p. 19.
See Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Furnish-
ing), 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 66 (1961). Though it was insisted that the plain
meaning of the statute should be followed. Brief for Respondent, p. 11.
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), (11),
61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11) (1959).
" The Board has applied the high-low level test in at least ten other
cases. See cases cited note 63 supra.
67 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F2.d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1962).
98 377 U.S. at 49-50.
"6 "'Produced' means produced, manufactured, mined, handled or in any
other manner worked on . . . ." Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(j), 52 Stat.
1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
O 105 CONG. REc. 17333 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
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to exclude distributors' employees from the protection of the pro-
viso rather than an understanding that "produced" included distrib-
uting activities. Such an intention, however, would be subject to
attack as arbitrary. There is no apparent basis for not extending
to distributors' employees a right that seems to be constitutionally
guaranteed.
The close distinctions made by the Court in these two decisions
seem to have been made with a favorable attitude toward the labor
movement. Implicit in them is a view that labor's right to present
its case to the public outweighs the damage that may be caused to
neutrals by necessary means of presenting that case. Yet the criteria
that this view forced upon the Court can be expected to haunt it
in later cases and, more certainly, to cause sleepless nights for
labor counsel. Will the Court protect consumer product picketing
of one-product retailers? If Congress is more explicit in banning
such picketing, will the Court respect its wishes? Most difficult,
what can the unions ask "any individual" to do or not to do? At
first examination, the labor movement might take comfort in an-
swers projected from these two decisions. A wiser approach would
be one tempered by caution.
CHARLES B. RoBsoN, JR.
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